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PRACTICAL adjective American English definition and synonyms

Applications for licensure as aLicensed Practical Nurse by Endorsementare exclusively accepted online. Applications for licensure as a Licensed Practical Nurse by Endorsement are exclusively accepted online. Applications for licensure as a Licensed Practical Nurse by Examination are exclusively accepted online. Submitting a licensure by Examination application with the Board so you can avoid delays in receiving your Authorization to Test issued by Pearson Vue. Legal checklists are utilized in the form of timelines, flow charts, tables, decision trees, and lists of issues to ensure you'll know how to proceed in any legal matter. Access practical, comprehensive and up-to-date content from experienced attorneys who have practiced at leading firms.

If you have graduated from a state-approved nursing education program and have been licensed by examination in another state within the U.S., or are scheduled to sit for the NCLEX in another state in the U.S., you may qualify for Licensure by Endorsement. RN/LPN licensure applicants are required to have a fingerprint-based criminal background check . There is no universally accepted measure of practical significance in the EEO field. What is considered practically significant depends on the employment opportunity at issue and the specific facts of the case.

The concept focuses on the contextual impact or importance of the disparity rather than its likelihood of occurring by chance. If your nursing education was completed in another countryandyou have been licensed by examination in another state within the U.S., you may qualify forLicensure by Endorsement. Letters of Recommendation – Applicants who have listed offenses on the application must submit 3-5 professional letters of recommendation from people you have worked for or with. Completion of Probation/Parole/Sanctions – Probation and financial sanction records for offenses can be obtained at the clerk of the court in the arresting jurisdiction. Parole records for offenses can be obtained from the Department of Corrections or at the clerk of the court in the arresting jurisdiction.

But how can the fact that a given means exhibits this kind of necessity give a person reason to choose the means, if the end is not itself something it would be valuable to achieve in some way? The instrumental principle seems to function as a binding norm of practical reason only if it is taken for granted that there are additional, independent standards for the assessment of our ends (Korsgaard 1997; Quinn 1993). Opponents of this kind of ethical consequentialism stress the discontinuities between moral and non-moral patterns of reasoning. They argue that morality is a source of demands that cannot be represented accurately within the framework of maximizing rationality (for example, Scanlon 1998, chap. 5). If this is correct, then we will be able to make sense of moral requirements, as norms that appropriately govern the reflections of individual agents, only if we expand our conception of the forms and possibilities of practical reason. The first of these, often referred to as internalism, holds that reasons for action must be grounded in an agent’s prior motivations (Williams 1981; cf. Finlay 2009).

Thus it is widely accepted that the rational action for a given agent to take is the one whose subjective expected utility—reflecting both the utility of possible outcomes, from the agent’s point of view, and the agent’s beliefs about the probability of those outcomes—is the highest. Externalists reject this picture, contending that one can have reasons for action that are independent of one’s prior motivations. They typically agree that practical reasoning is capable of generating new motivations and actions. They agree, in other words, that if agent s has reason to do x, it must be possible for s to acquire the motivation to x through reflection on the relevant reasons. But they deny that such reasoning must in any significant way be constrained by s’s subjective motivations prior to the episode of reasoning. Normative reflection is thus taken to be independent of one’s prior motivations, and capable of opening up new motivational possibilities .

By working out the meaning and implications of such antecedent commitments as loyalty or success, for instance, we also help to get clear the values that define who we really are . How, more generally, should we understand the relation between structural requirements and our reasons for action and belief? One view, held in common by Humeans and by some Kantian constructivists (see sec. 2 above), is Practical that reasons are fundamentally derivative from rational requirements. What one has reason to do, on this view, is what one would desire or intend to do if one was fully rational (i.e. fully in compliance with the wide-scope structural requirements that govern one’s attitudes in combination). A natural way to interpret this point of view is to contrast it with the standpoint of theoretical reason.

Humean proponents of structural approaches to practical reason have attempted to accommodate the rational criticism of individual ends, without departing from the spirit ofZweckrationalität, by expanding their view to encompass the totality of an agent’s ends. Thus, even if there are no reasons or values that are ultimately independent of an agent’s given ends, the possibility remains that we could criticize particular intrinsic desires by reference to others in an agent’s subjective motivational set. An agent’s desire for leisure, for instance, might be subordinated insofar as its satisfaction would frustrate the realization of other goals that are subjectively more important to the agent, such as professional success. Practical reason, it might be suggested, is a holistic enterprise, properly concerned not merely with identifying means to the realization of individual ends, but with the coordinated achievement of the totality of an agent’s ends. Theoretical reason, interpreted along these lines, addresses the considerations that recommend accepting particular claims as to what is or is not the case.

The capacity of practical reason to give rise to intentional action divides even those philosophers who agree in rejecting the expressivist strategy discussed above. Such philosophers are prepared to grant that there are normative and evaluative facts and truths, and to accept the cognitive credentials of discourse about this distinctive domain of facts and truths. But they differ in their accounts of the truth conditions of the normative and evaluative claims that figure in such discourse. Practical Law’s resources are written and maintained by over 650 dedicated full-time attorney-editors globally. Agency Records – All relevant documentation regarding the action should be sent to the board office by the licensing agency.

The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. Since the "importance" of a disparity is influenced by the magnitude of the impact, the notions of practical and statistical significance are related. Statistical significance is a function of multiple factors, including the magnitude of the disparity, the number of observations in the analysis, and the power of the statistical test used. The purpose of a statistical test is to assess the likelihood that random or legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors rather than discriminatory factors produced an observed disparity. Under certain conditions, a small disparity may be statistically significant due in large part to the size of the data set.